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InTroDucTIon 
In the absence of concerted action, global greenhouse gas emissions are projected to almost double by 2050. Much of this increase will come from industrialization in developing 
countries.1 Due to resource constraints and the conviction that 
developed countries must take responsibility for their historical 
emissions, most developing countries are unlikely to act aggres-
sively to restrain their emissions growth without substantial 
help from the developed world. Accordingly, the Bali Action 
Plan calls for a global deal in which developing countries take 
enhanced “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” supported 
by technology, financing, and capacity building from the devel-
oped world.2 This will require a substantial transfer of resources 
and capacity. The Stern Review estimated the incremental costs 
of necessary low-carbon investments in developing countries to 
be at least $20–30 billion per year.3 So far, however, little assis-
tance has been forthcoming. One of the most important poten-
tial outcomes of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) negotiations at Copenhagen will 
therefore be the creation of a publicly-funded mechanism that 
can provide sufficient concessional resources to help developing 
countries transition to lower carbon growth trajectories. 
A critical issue that the negotiators will have to resolve is 
how to define the mechanism’s funding criteria to ensure that 
its concessional funds are used most effectively. This poses an 
important strategic choice: will the mechanism focus exclusively 
on initiatives that can help catalyze transformational changes in 
existing emissions patterns, or will it also provide support for 
marginal improvements in the efficiency of existing technolo-
gies and practices? While the case for targeting concessional 
public funding towards emerging low-carbon technologies is 
compelling, there undoubtedly will be significant political pres-
sure from developing countries to allow support to also be used 
for incremental improvements in high-emitting sectors.  
The recent decision by the World Bank-administered Clean 
Technology Fund (“CTF”) to authorize support for certain 
coal-fired power plants may provide some insights into how 
the UNFCCC may resolve this issue. The CTF has an explicit 
mandate to finance “transformational action” to help developing 
countries transition to a low-carbon development path.4 Nev-
ertheless, its new financing criteria authorize support for coal 
technologies that may be only slightly more efficient than those 
that are already preferred by the private-sector, and that include 
carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) readiness criteria that have 
little chance of ever resulting in the capture or storage of any 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”). 
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The CTF’s willingness and ability to contravene its man-
date to catalyze transformational change with regard to coal 
does not bode well for Copenhagen. The World Bank is likely 
to have some influence in the structure of a UNFCCC mech-
anism, and has an institutional interest in promoting the CTF 
standards. Regardless of whether the World Bank plays a role in 
the UNFCCC mechanism, the negotiators may look to the CTF 
standards as precedent.  
Moreover, many of the broader political forces that pro-
duced the CTF standards will also be at play in Copenhagen. 
Participating countries have not called the CTF to account for 
its incrementalism because it largely reflects their policy prefer-
ences. Many participating countries are not yet ready to concede 
that the Earth’s dwindling carbon sink capacity can no longer 
support development strategies based on the relentless expan-
sion of fossil fuel consumption. Unless this political dynamic is 
altered at Copenhagen, there is little reason to expect the Parties 
to agree to markedly more ambitious criteria for a new UNFCCC 
mechanism. 
The clean Technology FunD 
The Clean Technology Fund is one of two Climate Invest-
ment Funds (“CIFs”) created by the World Bank and other mul-
tilateral development banks (“MDBs”) to provide an interim 
source of concessional financing while the UNFCCC mecha-
nism is being negotiated.5 The CTF will support public- and 
private-sector investments that contribute to “the demonstra-
tion, deployment and transfer of low-carbon technologies with 
a significant potential for long term greenhouse gas emissions 
savings.”6 Eligible investments include low-carbon power and 
transportation projects, and large-scale energy efficient initia-
tives and other demand management projects.7 
Although the CTF is administered by the World Bank, its 
decision-making process is partly independent of the gover-
nance structure of the Bank and the other MDBs. Every project 
funded by the CTF must be approved by both the board of the 
implementing MDB and a separate Trust Fund Committee of 
the CTF.8 Unlike the weighted voting at the MDBs that heavily 
favors donor governments, votes on the Trust Fund Committee 
are equally apportioned between eight representatives selected 
by the donor countries and eight representatives selected by the 
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recipient countries. The committee also includes a non-voting 
representative from the World Bank, the other participating 
MDBs, and the host country of any investment proposal that is 
under consideration.9 
the ctf’S focuS on tranSformational change 
The stated objective of the CTF is to support “transfor-
mational” actions that represent a “step change” over current 
practice.10 Towards this end, the CTF provides support for low-
carbon technologies that are approaching the point of “market 
take-off,” and that have the potential to significantly reduce 
emissions.11 Two categories of technology are eligible for assis-
tance. As a matter of priority, the CTF focuses on technologies 
that are already available commercially, but need incremental 
assistance to compete with con-
ventional options in the recipi-
ent country.12 It will also finance 
technologies that have been 
proven to be technically viable, 
but have not yet been commer-
cially deployed at scale. The 
CTF will not support technolo-
gies that are still in the research 
stage.13  
In theory, this is a sound 
strategy for targeting public sub-
sidies. Left to their own devices, 
private markets may let impor-
tant new technologies languish 
in the “valley of death” between 
laboratory success and commer-
cial viability.14 Innovations that 
mitigate social costs are par-
ticularly vulnerable to getting 
bogged down at this stage of 
development. Well-targeted public subsidies can provide a criti-
cal push to accelerate their commercial uptake.15 Accordingly, 
the CTF should target its scarce concessional funds at assistance 
that can help accelerate “near market” renewable energy tech-
nologies down the cost and learning curves to the point where 
they are competitive with fossil fuels.16 And to its credit, the CTF 
has recognized that the potential to reduce deployment costs and 
increase learning for future investments should be key consider-
ations in its decision to support a proposed investment.17 
an incrementaliSt approach to coal 
Yet, in practice, the CTF has subverted its strategy of facili-
tating the uptake transformational technologies by authorizing 
support for certain coal-fired power plants. Under its new guide-
lines, the CTF may provide subsidies for coal-fired plants that 
meet specified energy efficiency standards and are considered 
to be “ready” to capture and store carbon.18 This is a conspicu-
ously ill-advised use of scarce concessional financing for climate 
mitigation. Any coal plant financed by the CTF will emit enor-
mous quantities of CO2 for the foreseeable future. Concessional 
funds for bringing transformational technologies to market are 
relatively scarce. Instead of squandering these limited resources 
on incremental efficiency improvements for incumbent technol-
ogies, the CTF should focus on helping zero-emission alterna-
tives, such as base-load solar, become cost competitive. Indeed, 
using concessional public money to subsidize coal—however 
efficient—does nothing to hasten the day when low-carbon 
technologies can reliably out-compete coal and other fossil fuel-
based energy sources.19 
The CTF has compounded this strategic error by adopting 
permissive criteria for efficiency and CCS-readiness. The CTF 
ostensibly precludes the use of its funds to support sub- or super-
critical coal power plants.20 Its financing criteria, however, are 
not adequate to the task. The Criteria for Financing Low-Carbon 
Opportunities in Coal and Gas Power Investments (“Criteria”) 
note that “typical” supercriti-
cal coal-fired power plants with 
emission factors of 0.80 tons 
CO2 per megawatt hour (net) (t 
CO2/MWh (net)) are now “the 
system of choice for new com-
mercial coal-fired plants in many 
countries.”21 Nevertheless, the 
Secretariat has set the proposed 
baseline carbon-intensity thresh-
old for CTF investment at 0.795 
t CO2/MWh (net), a mere 0.005 t 
CO2/MWh (net) below the emis-
sion factor for the current “sys-
tem of choice.”22 In addition to 
being incredibly incrementalist, 
this standard may not be consis-
tent with the commitment not to 
finance super-critical plants. As 
the World Bank’s own private 
sector lending arm has noted, 
super-critical coal plants can achieve even lower emissions 
factors.23 
Worse, the 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) threshold is only an ini-
tial benchmark; it can be adjusted upward based on specified site- 
and country-specific conditions.24 This flexibility is not clearly 
constrained in the CTF Criteria. The Criteria do not (a) explain 
the circumstances in which these upward adjustments will be 
allowed; (b) propose any guidelines for MDB staff to implement 
them; or (c) establish maximum allowable adjustments. Under 
the Criteria, then, the CTF could presumably finance coal proj-
ects that are substantially more carbon-intensive than the base-
line 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) would appear to require, or even 
than the super-critical plants that the Trust Fund Committee has 
excluded. 
The Criteria also fail to require the use of control technolo-
gies for capturing other air pollutants, such as flue gas desul-
furizers (“FGD”), selective catalytic reducers (“SCR”), and 
low-nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) burners. These technologies are 
not necessarily required in developing countries, and their use 
reduces the efficiency (and thus increases the CO2 intensity) 
Many participating 
countries are not yet ready 
to concede that the Earth’s 
dwindling carbon sink 
capacity can no longer 
support development 
strategies based on the 
relentless expansion of 
fossil fuel consumption.
23 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
of a coal-fired plant.25 In the absence of specific pollution con-
trol standards, the Criteria may allow (or implicitly encour-
age) operators to meet CO2 emissions standards at the cost of 
increased emissions of other pollutants. This, too, is hardly 
transformational. 
The False promIse oF carbon capTure  
anD sTorage-reaDIness 
Arguably, the CTF could finance coal projects while meet-
ing its strategic objectives by limiting eligibility to CCS dem-
onstration projects that would help drive innovation and force 
down costs. However, the CTF has explicitly eschewed such a 
role. Because CCS technology is currently at the research and 
development stage, it is not eligible for CTF co-financing, even 
on a pilot or demonstration basis.26 Instead, a new coal-fired 
power plant need only be “CCS-ready” to be eligible for CTF 
financing. Under the CTF Cri-
teria, a plant will be considered 
CCS-ready if the project sponsor 
has: 
 a) provided adequate space 
in the design of the facility 
for the equipment needed to 
capture CO2;
 b) identified feasible options 
to transport CO2 to a stor-
age reservoir that is large 
enough to hold the lifetime 
emissions of the plant; and 
 c) conducted an analysis of 
CCS options and the viabil-
ity of plant with CCS operation.27 
Due to cost considerations, capital investment in CCS technol-
ogy is not required.28  
The most likely outcome of this approach is that CTF-
financed coal plants will remain “ready” for CCS indefinitely, 
but will never actually capture or store any CO2. As one wit has 
put it, calling these plants CCS-ready is like calling my drive-
way “Ferrari-ready:” my driveway can certainly accommodate 
a Ferrari, but the chances of one being parked there are van-
ishingly small.29 Although the basic technology is well under-
stood,30 commercial-scale CCS is not expected to be widely 
available for at least 15–20 years.31 In the best-case scenario, 
then, these plants will spew CO2 for the first third to half of their 
operational lifetimes. In reality, however, there is little reason to 
believe that CTF-financed plants will be early adopters of CCS 
technology. Since the CTF does not actually require retrofitting, 
and since CCS is expected to be extremely expensive and reduce 
plant efficiency by as much as a third,32 operators will not ret-
rofit on their own. Only strong regulatory requirements, a steep 
price on carbon, or a robust concessional financing regime will 
have the potential to induce a plant operator to undertake such 
an investment. 
None of these potential drivers of CCS uptake currently 
exists in the developing world, or is likely to be implemented 
in the near to middle term. Few if any developing countries are 
seriously considering carbon emissions regimes that would be 
stringent enough to eventually induce or require plant operators 
to retrofit their facilities with CCS technology. And assuming 
such regulations were to be enacted, there is little reason to be 
confident that they would be well-enforced. Even in countries 
with relatively effective regulatory and enforcement regimes, 
utilities have proven to be remarkably adept at avoiding or 
delaying mandates to upgrade their facilities to improve envi-
ronmental performance.33 
It is also unlikely that any country that might host a CTF-
financed coal project would implement policies to internalize 
the cost of carbon. In the current political environment, such a 
proposal would be a non-starter. But even if that were to change 
over time, the cost of carbon emissions would have to rise sig-
nificantly before it would make economic sense to implement 
CCS technology. A recent study 
by McKinsey estimates the cost 
of emissions reductions through 
CCS to begin at about $75–115 
per ton, and to decline by half 
after 2030 when the technol-
ogy has matured.34 By way of 
comparison, the price of carbon 
emissions under the European 
Trading Scheme is currently 
about €13 per ton (approxi-
mately U.S. $17 per ton).35 
The most likely way that 
CTF-financed projects would 
ever implement CCS technol-
ogy, then, is by accessing further concessional funds to finance 
the retrofit. But even this is highly speculative and, at best, a 
distant prospect. First, CCS is not currently eligible for cred-
its under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, 
the most important existing conduit for such financing.36 While 
this would likely change if the technology matured, the avail-
ability of carbon credits would not provide sufficient incen-
tives for operators to retrofit until the cost of abating emissions 
through CCS falls below the price of carbon credits. This is not 
expected to occur until at least 2030.37 Second, it is also possible 
that a new UNFCCC financing mechanism could support the 
retrofit CTF-financed projects. But even if concessional funds 
were made available for CCS retrofits, there is little reason to 
believe that CTF-financed projects would be the best candidates 
for these funds. Commercial scale CCS is so embryonic that it 
is too soon to say which of the currently available coal com-
bustion technologies will prove to be the most cost-effective to 
retrofit.38  
conclusIon: a cauTIonary Tale  
For copenhagen 
The best that can be said for the CTF’s willingness to finance 
coal-fired power plants is that, on its own terms, it is not likely 
to have a momentous impact on international efforts to redirect 
Although the basic 
technology is well 
understood, commercial-
scale CCS is not expected 
to be widely available for 
at least 15–20 years.
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developing countries toward lower-carbon development paths. 
To date, donors have pledged relatively small sums of money,39 
some of which may not be disbursed. And at least some of the 
money that eventually reaches the CTF will go to more appropri-
ate technologies. Indeed, the first three loans under consideration 
by the CTF, totaling U.S. $900 million, will support renewable 
energy and urban transport initiatives, not coal.40 In any event, 
the CTF is intended to be a short-term mechanism that will wind 
down its operations once the new UNFCCC financial architec-
ture has been put in place.41 
The critical question raised by the CTF’s embrace of coal, 
then, is what that decision may portend for the criteria to be 
adopted by the UNFCCC financing mechanism that is to be 
created in Copenhagen in December 2009. That mechanism is 
expected to be the primary conduit for developed countries to 
meet their obligations to finance the deployment and diffusion 
of low-carbon technologies in developing countries.  Moreover, 
under the Bali Action Plan, the mitigation efforts that develop-
ing countries will be expected to undertake will be explicitly 
linked to the kinds of financing and support that is provided by 
developed countries.42 As a result, the financing criteria adopted 
by the UNFCCC mechanism will be a key component of the 
effectiveness of the Copenhagen agreements. 
The CTF’s affiliation with the World Bank is likely to 
enhance its relevance in the Copenhagen negotiations. The 
World Bank will continue to be an influential player in Copen-
hagen, and appears to be positioning itself to play a key role in 
the implementation of the UNFCCC mechanism. But even if the 
World Bank is not afforded a direct role in the UNFCCC mecha-
nism, the negotiators may consider the CTF standards to be an 
important precedent for the UNFCCC’s financing criteria. His-
torically, there have been numerous examples of World Bank 
internal environmental and social standards being widely treated 
as international best practice, regardless of their substantive 
shortcomings.43   
Apart from the World Bank’s role, there are other rea-
sons to be concerned that the criteria adopted by a UNFCCC 
mechanism may not be demonstrably better than those of the 
CTF. Some developing countries are skeptical of renewable 
alternatives—particularly those technologies that are not yet 
commonly employed in developed countries. These countries 
would prefer to continue to rely on coal despite its environmen-
tal disadvantages.44 This preference was expressed in the Trust 
Fund Committee’s deliberations over the proposed standards, in 
which influential recipient country representatives endorsed the 
inclusion of coal and questioned the need for CCS-readiness cri-
teria. It has also been expressed by the Parties to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. At the CoP-11/CMP-1 in Montreal, the Parties instructed 
Annex II countries, and Annex I countries “in a position to do 
so” to give priority to “[c]ooperating in the development, diffu-
sion and transfer of less greenhouse-gas-emitting advanced fos-
sil-fuel technologies, and/or technologies relating to fossil fuels 
that capture and store greenhouse gases, and encouraging their 
wider use . . . .”45 
It remains to be seen whether the same political forces 
that shaped the CTF criteria will define the parameters of the 
UNFCCC mechanism. There is some reason to believe that 
the dynamics may be shifting. The U.S. Congress for example, 
recently refused to fund the CTF out of concern by some mem-
bers over the coal financing criteria.46 And perhaps the leadership 
of the new U.S. administration, or the urgency and heightened 
public scrutiny of the Copenhagen meetings, will create space 
for negotiators to take a more ambitious approach to mitigation 
financing than was evidenced by the CTF. But unless the politi-
cal dynamic is changed, there is little reason to expect that the 
outcomes will be any different.  
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